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The claims advanced in the following discussion both presuppose and elaborate upon the view
that the trajectory of the ’critique of metaphysics’ inaugurated by Kant is only to be regarded as
complete in the attempt to articulate a ’religion of the real’. Critique, conceived as the project of
the de-anthropomorphisation of thought and feeling, increasingly exposes the human organism to
the latent intrinsic divinity of the real and thereby provides an opportunity, personal capacities
permitting, to participate in reality’s auto-apotheosis. This requires, I suggest, a rehabilitation and
rethinking of (in terms unrecognisable to, for instance, Hume and Kant) ’natural religion’. In its
post-critical guise ’natural religion’ is no longer the attempt to construct an ’argument to design’
but the endeavour to articulate, in non-theistic terms, the religious propensities of the real itself
without transcendent reference. The conception of the task of philosophy from this perspective is
that of placing thought and feeling at the service of intrinsically divine tendencies within and of
the real itself and to thereby reintegrate and reorientate human intellectual and affective capacities
to what might be termed (with apologies to Freud) the religious ’primary narcissism’ of the real. It
is an underlying claim of the following reflections on aspects of Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s
thought that it is only through the pursuit of such a trajectory of critique and affirmation that
philosophy can reconfirm and revivify its hard won independence from both theology and natural
science respectively and thereby sustain and radicalise its most exacting historical task, namely,
the attainment of genuinely ’disinterested’ thought and a-subjective feeling, in short, metaphysics
proper.
Although the focus of this piece are converging features of Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s thought
respectively the wider project to which this discussion contributes – the articulation of a ’post-
metaphysical’ conception of ’natural religion’ - draws upon many thinkers and perspectives.
These include key figures in the ’phenomenology of religion’, particularly Otto and Eliade
alongside the pioneering work of James before them. Indeed, I consider the way forward in this
respect to consist in something of an ’unholy alliance’ of philosophical naturalism and
phenomenology. However, whilst acknowledging the limited value of such generalisations, I have
not found much of relevance to the project in question in the writings of those associated with the
’theological turn’ within phenomenology. Too many, it seems to me, ’shadows of God’ fall across
the pages of many of those associated with the trend in question and too little by way genealogical
acuity or awareness is evident in relation to the specific religious traditions that tend to be
privileged in the texts in question.
A deeper worry arises in this respect concerning the very possibility of the emergence of a
’theological turn’ in phenomenology. This is the suspicion that a lack of capacity and appetite for
genealogical critique was the ’Achilles’ heel’ of phenomenology from the outset, a factor at the
source of its constitutional anti-naturalism (or neo-idealism) that always precluded the possibility
of a naturalistic ontology of phenomenality or manifestation (in contrast to a phenomenology
conception of the natural order). Crudely put, reluctance is often detected within the
phenomenological tradition to unequivocally affirm the impersonal nature of the process of
presencing as such and to make it the focus of a reorientated reverence. Perhaps a symptom of this
reluctance to deify phenomenality per se is the dominant pathos of mourning and privation that
marks so many writers in this vein as they reflect upon the ’absence of the gods’ suggesting that
some sense our age, compared to others, is not quite granted the ’full ticket’ as regards the
disclosure of the real. In contrast, the thinkers to whom I am attracted, including Nietzsche and
Bergson, embrace unambiguously the historic opportunities afforded to thought and feeling by the
’death of God’ and do not wish to linger at the wake any longer than propriety demands. They
seek to explore and articulate, in a mood of barely concealed celebration, the now ’open sea’ of
full-blown religious atheism aware that, for those of a non-moral disposition, the real presences
with equal disclosive force in all epochs.[i]
The reconceived ’natural religion’ advocated in what follows is unequivocally impersonal and
atheistic. It proposes that the human organism interpret the ’death of God’ as the opportunity to
explicitly orientate its worship to the now emergent essence of religion as manifest in the self-
sufficient order of natural immanence in which the organism is immersed without remainder. The
task of philosophy is to guide thought and feeling towards a participation in the primary process
of creative becoming as and when this reasserts its ontological primordiality. Hence, in contrast to
the secular-transcendental riposte made by Janicaud to the currently rampant ’theological’
appropriation of phenomenology, I propose that it be challenged from the trajectory of a
naturalistic and atheistic ’religious’ turn already to be found, I suggest, in the thought of Nietzsche
and Bergson.[ii]
I
Before discussing aspects of Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s thought respectively in relation to an
attempt to articulate a notion of ’natural religion’ in terms of immanence and without reference to
design it is worth recalling and emphasising shared features of their respective philosophical
problematics and their pertinence to the broader project sketched here.
Arguably Nietzsche and Bergson develop the two most significant philosophical biologies
elaborated thus far and both, fairly uncontentiously I suggest, promote the claim that natural life is
’religious’ in essence. Both thinkers persistently seek to affirm and prioritise the religious essence
of natural life within their respective philosophical naturalisms. They also share a ’monistic’
(albeit non-reductive and pluralistic in expression) conception of life, Nietzsche in terms of ’will
to power’, Bergson the ’vital impetus’ (élan vital). On the basis of these primary philosophico-
biological principles, both Nietzsche and Bergson reject the presumed primacy of a functional-
utilitarian (i.e. adaptative, passive-reactive) conception of life’s inherent tendencies. They
challenge the presumed primacy of ’self-preservation’ and endeavour to conceive life as, first and
foremost, an active-creative process irreducible to the anthropomorphic categories of either causal
determinism or teleology. It is noteworthy that both Nietzsche and Bergson are pioneers in
explicitly taking issue with, from a naturalistic perspective, the philosophical and normative
presuppositions they identify in Darwin (and historically related figures such as Spencer). Both
are keenly aware that, if the underpinnings of Darwin’s thought are illegitimately given primary
ontological status, then access to the religious tendency of natural life would be debarred. Among
the shared critical concerns in this respect are an insistence on life as an active ’form-creating’
force; the estimation of adaptation as a secondary process; the requirement to undertake a critique
of empirical knowledge, including biology, that seeks to reintegrate it  within a wider ’theory of
life’; an instrumentalist conception of the nature and role of empirical science, etc.  Furthermore,
both Nietzsche and Bergson emphasis the ontological primacy of time and both the ’will to
power’ and the ’vital impulse’ implicitly affirm the eternity of becoming. Here we refer, without
claiming an equivalence, to the notions of ’eternal recurrence’ (Nietzsche) and ’duration’
(Bergson) respectively.
More contentiously, I take both Nietzsche and Bergson to be ’non-cognitivists’. That is to say,
both thinkers assert the ontological primacy of affectivity thereby viewing life as first and
foremost ’felt’ and ’lived’ before it is conceived and thought. From such a philosophical
perspective cognitive content is always derivative of extra-cognitive sources such that it is taken
to be philosophically naïve to remain on the level of content and signification. Indeed, from such a
philosophical viewpoint it is the ineliminably motivated and ’interested’ character of the cognitive-
perceptual functions of the human organism, nowhere more operative and determining than in its
scientific endeavour, which represents the main challenge to critical philosophy in its pursuit of a
genuinely ’disinterested’ thinking. For both Nietzsche and Bergson (although admittedly more
obviously so in the former) this ’non-cognitivism’ entails that the critical evaluation of a body of
thought hastens to move beyond the assessment of the truth and consistency of its propositional
content and presumed commitments on the order of reference to expose and interrogate the
affective economy that constitutes it. Content (i.e. metaphysical structures, categories and
propositional claims) is regarded as a symptom of affective essence which requires a psycho-
physiological diagnosis rather than a rational-logical refutation.
Indeed, Nietzsche in effect signals an ultimate non-attachment to any specific content or
categorical schema insofar as no such adherence necessarily guarantees what he takes to be the
ultimate critical issue, namely, the quality of will underlying it.[iii] If the decisive arguments in
the Genealogy concerning the distinctions to be made between origin and purpose, process and
meaning are recalled[iv] it is clear that, for Nietzsche, no conceptual content comes with an in-
built affective correlate (or vice versa) but remains, as with all phenomena, subject to the on-going
struggle of appropriating forces. Hence no conceptual-cognitive content is excused in relation to
Nietzsche’s most fundamental critical-evaluative question: "is it hunger or superabundance that
has become creative here?"[v]
Hence, both Nietzsche and Bergson conceive their respective philosophical-biological principles
in affective terms. That is to say that both conceive life as first and foremost as a qualitative
process, an auto-affectivity of and within heterogeneous time without reference to quantification
or objectification. Of necessity, due to the exigencies of practical and social existence, life has to
rendered capable of measurement but the magnitudes by which this exigency is achieved tell us,
Nietzsche and Bergson insist, nothing of its temporal-affective nature.
For the philosophy of religion such ’non-cognitivism’ has fundamental consequences not the least
of which is an emphasis (appreciated, admittedly, by many phenomenological approaches in this
area as well) on the primacy of ’religious experience’ and its underlying libidinal-affective
determinants. For both Nietzsche and Bergson the ’deification of existence’[vi]  - life’s own
religious affirmation - is exclusively disclosed in and through the passions.[vii] Indeed, it is to be
identified in toto with such influxes of a-subjective affect. For both thinkers this auto-
transfiguration of nature occurs as joy in an unqualified affirmation of all aspects of the real
without remainder. It also forms the naturalistic basis of Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s critical-
evaluative approach to specific organised religions, an assessment which focuses not on coherence
and validity but on the quality of the sensibility expressed therein. In this regard we can think of
Nietzsche’s distinction between ’healthy’ and ’sick’ forms of religious sensibility and Bergson’s
contrast between ’static’ and ’dynamic’ religion.
Taken together the broad affinities found between these two pre-eminent philosophical biologies
form the basis of a suspicion shared by both Nietzsche and Bergson in relation to both anti-
natural religions and (less generally recognised) anti-religious naturalisms. Both thinkers reject
the predominant modern ’functionalist’, socio-anthropological interpretation of religion and its
implicit assumption that religion that claim no constitutive ontological status, that it is not part of
the fabric of natural life itself; in short, that ultimately there is no ’reality of the sacred’. From
such a reductionist perspective, insofar as natural life is credited with any indigenous semiotic
capacities at all, it is uncritically assumed that these could not take a religious form the latter
being exclusively a ’projection’ of an entirely anthropological origin.[viii] The only contestable
issue from such a viewpoint concerns the value of religion, whether it is an expression of human
frailty that ought to be eradicated or, alternatively, the source of a positive framework of purpose
and meaning.[ix] In contrast to the, admittedly often strong, riposte made by many
phenomenologically orientated thinkers to this secular-naturalist, reductionist consensus,
Nietzsche and Bergson propound an alternative critique of it from the perspective of a non-
reductive naturalism. I shall now turn to each of these thinkers respectively to explicate further
these general claims.
II
I shall not rehearse here arguments I have made elsewhere by way of a contribution to the now
quite widespread view that, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, Nietzsche is to be
conceived as first and foremost a ’religious thinker’.[x] Instead I shall address an initial, seemingly
difficult impasse that strikes many readers of Nietzsche including those who are otherwise
sympathetic to the interpretative perspective sketched here. Taking The Gay Science as a prime
example, the stumbling block in question concerns the often baffling conjunction within
Nietzsche’s text of, on the one hand, a supremely joyous affirmative religious celebration of life
and, on the other hand, an uncompromising demand, unsurpassed in its radicality, that the project
of ’de-deification’ be pursued to a hitherto unimagined extent (i.e., extended to the constitutive
normativities of metaphysics, modern science and the values of secular humanism’). It is a
requirement of the interpretative stance promoted here that it demonstrate that far from any
ultimate incompatibility arising between these two aspects of Nietzsche’s text, they mutually
support and entail each other and thereby exclude and undermine the credibility of alternative,
ostensibly non-religious, responses to the ’death of God’ (in particular, humanism and scientific
atheism).
In simple terms it is clear that, for Nietzsche, the realisation of critique involved in the project of
’de-deification’ is an essential pre-requisite to the ’deification of existence’. The former liquidates
the transcendent God and its ’shadows’ (which include any exaggeration of the ontological status of
natural science) which are dissolved to allow the auto-deification of the real to display itself. Indeed
the two processes, ’de-deification’ and the ’religious affirmation of life’ and the transition
between them, are implicit in the first formulation of these themes in The Gay Science,
When will all these shadows of God no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-
deified [entgöttlicht] nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly
discovered, newly redeemed nature [erlösten Natur]? [xi]
Of course, Nietzsche assists our navigation of this move from ’de-deification’ to the ’deification
of existence’ in his delimitation of the ontological reach of science [xii] sharing, with Bergson, an
instrumentalist conception of it. More significantly however, is Nietzsche’s clear rejection and
critique of scientific atheism. Nietzsche seeks to wrest atheism away from science and reclaim it
for religion which must also, of course, thereby undergo a process of ’de-deification’.  Both The
Gay Science and Genealogy seek to establish the genealogical intimacy between Christianity and
modern science, the shared constitutive values behind their mutually self-sustaining
’opposition’, their shared commitment to the ’will to truth’.[xiii] This kinship precludes, for
Nietzsche the claim of science to offer the historically demanded alternative to the ’ascetic ideal’.
This critique of the scientific form of atheism is clear in the following famous formulation,
 …it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests – that even we knowers of
today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-
year old faith, the Christian faith…[xiv]
In a similar vein Nietzsche inveighs against ’pale atheists’[xv] criticising the self-delusion of their
claim to have attained ’free spirit’ status and exposing their genealogical solidarity with their
theistic ’opponents’ in relation to shared fundamental values (i.e., the ’ascetic ideal’ in its essence
as the ’unconditional will to truth’). Indeed, building towards his most audacious claim that
modern science is essentially the auto-destructive consummation of Christianity, Nietzsche offers
the following critique of atheism’s mistaken self-image,
   Everywhere…that the spirit is…at work today…it now does so without ideals entirely
   - the popular expression for this abstinence is "atheism" – except for its will to truth. This
   will..this remnant of an ideal is…not so much its remnant as its core. Unconditional honest
   atheism…is…not in opposition to that ideal…it is the awe-inspiring catastrophe of a two-
   thousand-year discipline in truth, which in the end forbids itself the lie involved in belief in
  God.[xvi]
In short, for Nietzsche, scientific atheism is to be understood as a form of hyper-Christian
moralism, "Christian morality itself…translated and sublimated into the scientific conscience, into
intellectual cleanliness at any price".[xvii] Taken together, the passages cited support the claim
that Nietzsche pursues the task of ’de-deification’ in order to affirm the religious essence of the
real. For Nietzsche, scientific atheism pursues, in contrast, a superficial and incomplete form of de-
deification as it is the covert ’outwork’ of Christianity, the last desperate expression of a
profoundly anthropomorphic religion in its struggle against the indigenous divinity of the real.
Scientific atheism is, for Nietzsche, the latest manifestation and contemporary acceptable face of
the evaluative-affective appropriating force that, in defence of its anti-religious commitment to the
’ascetic ideal’ as the ’will to truth’, abandons the Church. Such a conception of the trajectory of
Nietzsche’s critical-affirmative project allows us to hear the genuinely religious fervour behind
what can sometimes appear to be rather superficial rhetorical ploys in his struggle with
Christianity. An example of this can be identified in Nietzsche’s (admittedly somewhat
desperate!) yearning for the "redeeming human of the great love and contempt" who will, "bring
home the redemption of this reality (die Erlösung dieser Wirklichkeit): its redemption from the
curse that the previous ideal placed upon it".[xviii]
A further significant feature of Nietzsche’s thought is important to the basic task of locating and
excavating the religious core of his critical endeavour. This is Nietzsche’s distinctive and
persistent rejection of the value of ’universalism’, his questioning of its purported desirability and
role as a socio-political and cultural ’regulative ideal’.[xix]  For Nietzsche ’universalism’
harmfully suppresses the reality of radically incommensurable ’types of will’, which he articulates
in terms of the distinction between ’nobility’ and ’slavery’, underpinned by a conception of the
contrast between ’health’ and ’sickness’ in turn conceived as the capacity for an ’affirmation’
rather than a ’denial’ of life. Nietzsche’s cultural-politics, at its most plausibly modest, simply
makes a plea for some cultural ’breathing-space’ for the well-constituted given the suffocating
hegemony of moral or ’herd’ values.
This aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is important here on two counts. Firstly, it confirms the
possibility of demarcating ’healthy’ and ’sick’ forms of religious sensibility rather than
identifying religion per se as a morbid phenomenon. Secondly and to reiterate the ontological
primacy Nietzsche’s accords to affectivity, the distinctions in question remind us that Nietzsche
orientates all evaluation of religion away from an assessment of its categorical content as concerns
its rationality towards the clarification the affective-libidinal sensibility that lies at its origin and
essence and its assessment in terms of the criteria of his philosophical biology. In effect, this
concerns the sketching of different affective-libidinal phenomenologies of religious life reflecting
contrasting ’types of will’. In this vein we find the extraordinary accounts given in the Genealogy
of ’sick’ religiosity, the description of the libidinal economy of the ’feeling of guilt’ and account
of its origin and historical development, the nature of the ’ascetic priest’ as the virtuosic, self-
interested ’physician’ to the ’sick’ and, ultimately, the reflections on the source of the
attractiveness to the human will of the ’ascetic ideal’.[xx]
For Nietzsche, the ontological basis of the difference in libidinal-affective types under
consideration here lies in the extent to which one’s sensibility is claimed either by the interests of
the individuated ego or by the transpersonal flow of non-individuated yet self-differential natural
life within which the human organism is immersed without remainder. Nietzsche’s
’Dionysianism’ simply records that his libidinal-affective economy predominantly belonged to
trans-individual, rather than individuated, life and that, ultimately, he was, as determined by such
a physiological tendency (within the politics of ’his’ organism) more invested in the infinite (self-
differential life) rather than the finite (individuated life).[xxi] Both Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s
thought contain and presuppose the recognition of such a difference between, on the one hand, a
trans-individual order of self-difference and relation and, on the other hand, an individuated
domain of individuation founded upon negation.[xxii] Only individuated life undergoes ’death’ as
the trans-individual register is characterised by an ’eternity’ of impersonal self-difference. Both
Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s atheistic religiosity moves within this difference and the experience of
it.
A significant, albeit minority, seam of Nietzsche interpretation has always insisted on the
importance, when reading Nietzsche, of being attuned to an all-pervasive current within his texts
of very specific ’religious feeling’ in response to life.[xxiii] An affective register of joy, gratitude
and affirmation that celebrates embodied life without transcendent appeal despite, indeed on the
basis of  its indifference to the fate of the individual and refusal to reduce itself to the categories
and principles of the human intellect. Nietzsche’s text have as their tonal-affective centre the
expression of a joyously affirmative response to precisely those aspects of existence which,
evaluated negatively by those lacking the capacity for their affirmation, lead to that rejection of
real Nietzsche exposes and interrogates relentlessly. This, fundamentally irreligious denial of the
real occurs, for Nietzsche, firstly, in the form of ’Platonic-Christian’ metaphysics and religion
and, subsequently, in the form of modern science. It is the very conceivability of an alternative
affective-libidinal religious response to the ’negativity’ of the real than that which generated the
’Platonic-Christian’ tradition which renders redundant the overwhelmingly predominant
assumptions concerning the origins of religion as these are found in the dominant secular-
naturalistic theories of religion – or at least punctures their claim to universality. Nietzsche’s
religious affirmation of the a-morality and irreducibility of life to cognition, his celebration of its
primary non-egoic violence and desire to unite with it, requiring as it does, the disconnection with
self-preservation and utility[xxiv] are all characteristics of a religious attitude entirely missed by
most modern theorists of the sources of religion.[xxv]
Indisputably Nietzsche’s elaboration of a ’healthy’ religious sensibility is far less developed than
his exhaustive exposition and critique of its alternative. Perhaps of necessity Nietzsche’s texts are
often frustratingly enigmatic and merely suggestive in this respect.[xxvi] An example is
Nietzsche’s account of the ’elevated mood’ of the ’healthy’ type as, "a perpetual movement
between high and low and the feeling of high and low; a continual sense of ascending stairs and at
the same time of resting on clouds." [xxvii] The general emotional tone is that of an out-pouring
of joy in relation to life’s inherent dysteleology, jubilation at its irresolvable a-symmetry with
human cognitive capacities and psycho-physiological needs and weaknesses. A feeling of
profound gratitude in response to the immanent sublimity of life itself [xxviii] and an affirmative
response to the ultimate ethical challenge confronting the human will, namely, ’eternal
recurrence’ and the overcoming it demands of the will’s endemic ’revenge against time’. These
seem to be, for Nietzsche, the hallmarks of a ’healthy’ religious sensibility. Often Nietzsche
evokes and develops a novel conception of ’happiness’ far removed from that presupposed in
’virtue ethics’ and utilitarianism (although significantly closer to the former!) respectively and
closely related to a feeling of superabundance. This is induced through a becoming one with a
primary expenditure Nietzsche identifies within life as ’will to power’ itself, conceived as a
movement of ’self-overcoming’. He writes in this respect of a, "divine happiness full of power
and love…a happiness which, like the sun in the evening, continually draws on its inexhaustible
riches, giving them away and pouring them into the sea…"[xxix]
III
Bergson, arguably, pursues a ’de-deification of nature’ to the degree demanded by Nietzsche.
Furthermore, many of Bergson’s texts are pervaded by a ’religious’ atmosphere, an aspect which
becomes thematically explicit in his last major work, The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion.[xxx] Taken together these two key aspects of Bergson’s thought indicate that, like
Nietzsche’s, it moves in the direction of a radically reconfigured conception of ’natural
religion’.[xxxi] An indication of the shared critical-affirmative trajectory of Nietzsche’s and
Bergson’s thought is evident in the latter’s landmark article, "An Introduction to
Metaphysics"[xxxii] in which the task of philosophy is identified with the pursuit of the
transcendence of the ’human’ through an affirmative re-engagement with immanent nature
towards the attainment of a more originary, non-transcendent, form of transcendence
characteristic of natural immanence, a trajectory which is, it is claimed here, inherently
’religious’. Thus Bergson famously declares that, "philosophy can only be an effort to transcend
the human condition"[xxxiii] which is aligned with the attainment of a "true empiricism"[xxxiv]
which in turn, it is suggested, is to be recognised as the "true metaphysics".[xxxv]
In his first major work, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of
Consciousness[xxxvi] Bergson introduces central themes of his thought which, whilst admittedly
still confined to something like a transcendental phenomenology of consciousness, already
bespeak an immanent ’religious’ orientation. Although it surpasses the remit and scope of this
piece, it is claimed here that, at least considered retrospectively from the viewpoint of the
subsequent development of Bergson’s thought, that basic features of Time and Free Will can be
best interpreted as a preliminary attempt to complete both the ’de-deification of nature’ (i.e., the
identification and displacement of anthropomorphic categories and normativities) and articulate
the ’deification of existence’ (the affirmative recognition of nature’s intrinsic self-transcendence)
that it precipitates. The remarkable distinction Bergson articulates between ’two types of
multiplicity’[xxxvii] through which a notion of difference prior to negation is recovered and the
elaboration of the notion of ’duration’ as constitutive of ’lived’, irreducibly qualitative, inner
consciousness can be fore-grounded in this respect.[xxxviii]
Although sufficient argument cannot be provided here, the suggestion being made is that
Bergson’s conception of the ontological primacy of qualitative time, of ’perpetual becoming’, can
be credibly identified with the ’deification of existence’. In this respect, the ’divine’ simply is the
ontologically constitutive process of ’succession without externality’[xxxix]. God simply is, from
this perspective, an impersonal "confused multiplicity"[xl], an ontological permeation
process.[xli] As an intrinsically ’lived’ process this implicit conception of the ’divine’ beyond
’onto-theology’ is inherently elusive and irreducible to the instrumental concerns and orientation
of the human intellect driven as it is by an "insatiable desire to separate"[xlii] that culminates in
the entirely anthropomorphic notion of a transcendent God. Bergson’s early work invites us to
contrast the genuinely temporal God of ’confused multiplicity’ with the more familiar (as
anthropomorphic), ontologically derivative, spatio-geometric God of ’discrete multiplicity’.[xliii]
Indisputably the ’religious’ Bergson posited here only begins to emerge, more or less explicitly, in
his magnum opus, namely, Creative Evolution.[xliv] This text completes, in effect, the ’de-
deification of nature’ project through the articulation of a radical conception of time as ontological
force within the context of a philosophical naturalism in which Bergson offers his conception of
enduring life, "a philosophy which sees in duration the very stuff of reality…to show that a self-
sufficient reality is not necessarily a reality foreign to duration".[xlv] Among the many themes in
Creative Evolution of relevance to the claims of this piece the following can be highlighted.
Firstly, Bergson repeatedly focuses on and endeavours to articulate, the inter-face between the
movement of life itself and its utilitarian translation into ’human experience’.[xlvi] Bergson refers
to this moment of transition and self-surpassing in which the human organism, uniquely it seems,
gains access to nature of the real as the ’indistinct fringe’ [une frange indécise].[xlvii] In effect,
this is a ’religious’ theme which marks the advent of an awareness of the impersonal immensity of
durational life within which the ’human’ occurs and from which it isn’t debarred access because,
as a living organism itself, it is a part of the real.[xlviii] It is noteworthy that, in effect, Bergson
here credits the human organism with a capacity for ’disinterested’ thought and feeling.[xlix]
Secondly, by way of a partial justification of the proposed ’religious’ reading of Bergson
suggested here, evidence will be offered of a ’poetic’ dimension of Creative Evolution in which
what Nietzsche refers to as the ’religious affirmation of life’ wells-up in Bergson’s text,
culminating in one of the stranger definitions of ’God’ in the literature! In contrast, the equivalent
in Creative Evolution of Nietzsche’s motif of the ’death of God’ is, perhaps, Bergson’s persistent
attack on the credibility of the notion of a "superhuman intellect"[l] for whom "all is given" [li]
such that time is, ultimately, ontologically inconsequential, merely an inconvenient mark of
finitude. As if time did not contribute substantively to the being of living things and was not the
source of the perpetual creation of new and unforeseeable forms, the font of novelty.
The notion of the ’indistinct fringe’ marks the point at which Bergson seeks to return evolutionary
biology into its forgotten condition of possibility - the ontological order of durational life itself.
This is the move from a thinking (evolutionary biology) derived from, and limited to, the
utilitarian concerns of the human species to a disinterested mode of thought reconnected to the
generative source of thinking itself. This is a ’religious’ trajectory that seeks to reintegrate thought
and feeling into creative life itself and allow itself to become a vessel of its more primordial
processes. The necessarily half-hearted naturalism of evolutionary biology is surpassed by a more
uncompromising affirmation of the natural order, in principle beyond the reach of science.
Bergson’s direction of travel in Creative Evolution here is always only immanent. With Nietzsche
he shares the view that thought becomes more anthropomorphic the more transcendent are its
aspirations and categories and more religious insofar as it radicalises its naturalism. The
movement of critique within Creative Evolution can be conceived as the ’destruction’ of two
related reductionisms (empirical science and transcendent religion) and the emergence in their
place of an anti-reductionist, religious naturalism. This movement seems to be indicated in the
following passages,
  We do not think real time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect. The feeling we
  have…of the evolution of all things in pure duration is there, forming around the intellectual
  concept…an indistinct fringe…mechanism and finalism agree in taking account only of the
  bright nucleus shining in the centre. They forget that this nucleus has been formed out of the
  rest by condensation and that the whole must be used…to grasp the inner movement of
  life…if the fringe exists…it should have more importance for philosophy than the bright
  nucleus it surrounds…what can this useless fringe be, if not that part of the evolving
  principle which has not shrunk to the peculiar form of our organization?..It is there, that
  we must look…to expand the intellectual form of our thought; from there shall we derive the
  impetus necessary to lift us above ourselves.[lii]
A ’disinterestedness’ is evoked here which, unlike the transcendent orientation of its Kantian
predecessor, is aligned with an ever-increasing immersion in immanent nature towards the
"coincidence of human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates".[liii]
I shall conclude this brief identification of relevant themes from Creative Evolution by citing
some passages in which the renaturalisation of the human organism into the durational whole of
life assumes a decidedly religious tone:
  Like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it passes, the living turn upon themselves, borne up
  by the great blast of life. They…counterfeit immobility so well that we treat each of them
as
  a thing rather than as a progress, forgetting that the very permanence of their form is only
  the outline of a movement. At times, however, in a fleeting vision, the invisible breath that
 bears them is materialized before our eyes…a glimpse of the fact that the living being is
 above all a thorough-fare, and that the essence of life is in the movement by which life is
 transmitted.[liv]
In a similar vein:
Yet a beneficent fluid bathes us, whence we draw the very force to labor and to live. From this
ocean of life, in which we are immersed, we are continually drawing something, and
we feel that our being, or at least the intellect that guides it, has been formed therein by a
kind
of local concentration. Philosophy can only be an effort to dissolve again into the
Whole…by
expanding the humanity in us and making us even transcend it.[lv]
Here we see, I would suggest, the same movement of critical-affirmative thought as that
undertaken by Nietzsche, an overcoming of the human conceived as the critique of the
transcendent or ’moral’ (i.e. unmasked as merely utilitarian) conception of transcendence in
favour of its immanent form, a ’this worldly’, naturalistic transcendence in which the nature
intensifies rather than escapes itself. Nature, conceived as a creative evolution, is an incessant
becoming or self-transcendence, "what is admirable in itself, what really deserves to provoke
wonder, is the ever-renewed creation which reality, whole and undivided, accomplishes in
advancing."[lvi] On this basis, Bergson offers the following conception of ’God’,
I speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display – provided
however, that I do not present this centre as a thing, but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus
defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom.[lvii]
God is here the term for an impersonal "power of creation."[lviii] Bergson does not, like many of
those within the ’theological turn’ school of phenomenology, offer the resources of a radical
temporal ontology of natural life to theology in order to enable it to develop a more sophisticated
conception of a transcendent personal deity but instead proposes that we reorientate our
devotional feelings towards the deification of duration itself, the creative passage of impersonal
time.
IV
Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion contains many themes relevant to the
concerns of this discussion. The non-reductive character of Bergson’s discussion of morality and
religion in his final major work follows from the fact that represents an extension to the moral,
religious and socio-political domains of the naturalistic ontology of Creative Evolution. Bergson
introduces contrasts between ’open’ and ’closed’ forms of morality and ’static’ and ’dynamic’
forms of religion with the first of each pair in each case referring to the biological formation and
maintenance of stable societies, the latter with their growth and progress. These distinctions recall
Nietzsche’s contrast between "species-preserving and species-enhancing"[lix] values and forces,
with the ontological primacy of the latter asserted.
Minimally, Nietzsche and Bergson share a conception of the biologically-grounded nature of
religion in a primary sense. Neither thinker pursues (at least not in relation to ’healthy’ or
’dynamic’ religion respectively) a reductionist explanation of it in non-religious terms. Neither
Nietzsche nor Bergson assume the primacy of a merely ’survivalist’ or ’functionalist’ tendency
within nature and thus they reject the reductionist explanations of the origin and role of religion
(per se) that often characterise accounts of it offered by evolutionary biologists. Rather, both
thinkers seek to identify a becoming-religious of the real itself, a self-affirmation which takes
place as a specific type of autonomous, ontological affectivity implanted in exceptional members
of one of its creative experiments – the human organism.
This perspective presupposes the credibility of an order of emotion that has ontological status and
is thus not a merely subjective feeling arising in response to, and therefore dependent and
subsidiary to, an object. This possibility (doubtless initiated in its modern form in Kant’s
insistence on an order of transcendental affectivity) is implicit in Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s
shared conception of the real as, in essence, a qualitative becoming. Bergson offers an extended
and impressive theory and phenomenology of ontological emotion in Two Sources.[lx] A shared
conception of ’God’ can be detected here as both thinkers identify the divine as (rather than
merely a product of) a specific type of a-subjective ’desire-flow’ through and as which the ’will-to-
power’ or ’élan vital’ respectively manifest and reaffirm themselves. As Bergson states, "divine
love is not a thing of God: it is God Himself."[lxi]
In this context, in which God is identified as natural life’s Grundstimmug, both Nietzsche and
Bergson accord ’mysticism’ pride of place.[lxii] Bergson seeks to conceive mysticism in "relation
to the vital impulse…it is this impulse itself, communicated to exceptional individuals who in turn
would fain impart it to all humanity"[lxiii]. This further underlines Bergson’s view of the
intrinsically religious nature of reality. As he states, "the ultimate end of mysticism is the
establishment of a contact…a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself
manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not God himself."[lxiv] Indeed Bergson offers what is, in
effect, a formulation of the entire trajectory of his thought culminating in the discussion of
mysticism under consideration,
  For this intuition was turned inward; and if, in a first intensification, beyond which most
  of us did not go, it made us realise the continuity of our inner life, a deeper intensification
  might carry it to the roots of our being, and thus to the principle of life in general. Now is
  not this the privilege of the mystic soul?"[lxv]
As in Nietzsche, for Bergson the ontological affect in question here is joy [lxvi] and he offers a
sustained phenomenology of its development [lxvii] towards the attainment of the condition of
"complete mysticism"[lxviii] characterised as "an unmixed joy, lying beyond pleasure and
pain." [lxix] The watchwords in this non-reductive renaturalisation of mysticism are energy and
vitality, for Bergson the mystics, "represent a vast expenditure of energy…the superabundance of
vitality…flows from a spring which is the very source of life…God, Who is this energy
itself."[lxx] Again it is apparent that, for Bergson, ’God’ is not simply the supreme object of the
mystic’s desire but is rather, in toto, the very inundation of a-subjective energy and affectivity
itself.[lxxi]  This conception of mysticism as the very creative becoming of life itself, and
particularly Bergson’s privileging of Christian mysticism[lxxii] raises, in comparison with
Nietzsche, the diagnostic question concerning the aetiology of mystical states and ’religious
experience’ more generally. Whilst admittedly Bergson does not explore this issue with anything
like Nietzsche’s tenacity and suspicion he does address the issue (see TSMR, pp. 228ff, 245f, 250)
and indicates due critical restraint.[lxxiii] However, as with Nietzsche, Bergson insists on
demarcating a non-morbid form mysticism in which, "there is an exceptional, deep-rooted mental
healthiness."[lxxiv]
It is important to note the extent to which Bergson implicitly reasserts throughout Two Sources an
essential feature of the reconceived ’natural religion’ suggested throughout this discussion. This is
the claim that there is a universal origin and source of religion intrinsic to natural life, in principle
available to all independently of organised religion, which specific religions affirm in varying
degrees. Bergson formulates this point thus,
  …an original content, drawn straight from the very well-spring of religion, independent
  of all that religion owes to tradition, to theology, to the Churches…philosophy…must
  confine itself to experience and inference…it would suffice to take mysticism unalloyed,
  apart from the visions, the allegories, the theological language which express it, to make
it a
  powerful helpmate to philosophical research…we must then find out in what measure
mystic
  experience is a continuation of the experience which led us to the doctrine of the vital
  impetus. All the information with which it would furnish philosophy, philosophy would
  repay in the shape of confirmation.[lxxv]
Bergson concludes his text with a very striking formulation, again implicitly radicalising the
notion of ’natural religion’ that inverts the trajectory of the ’design argument’ and underlines the
extent to which his thinking, like Nietzsche’s before him, surpasses the banal terms of the debates
between ’intelligent design’ and evolutionary biology. Both thinkers enable us to recognise such
an ’opposition’ as essentially a dispute between two forms of neurosis concerning nature’s primal
religious dysteleology. As Bergson states, "…the essential function of the universe…a machine
for the making of gods."[lxxvi]
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